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BEAUTIFUL WINDS OF CHANGE: Do BUSH'S
RECENT SUPREME COURT APPOINTEES
MEAN THE END OF FACE?
MATTEI RADU*
On May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entranceways Act ("FACE" or "Act").' FACE made it a
federal crime to prevent persons from going into an abortion facility.2 As a
result, there was a substantial decrease in pro-life direct action, particularly
rescue.
During the confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both
sides of the abortion controversy focused on whether either would vote to
overturn the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.3 In sharp contrast, pro-life and pro-abortion forces
seem largely to have failed to notice the effect the two new jurists might
have on the ability of pro-life citizens to vigorously and effectively protest
abortion.4 Nevertheless, there is evidence that both Roberts and Alito share
a narrow Commerce Clause philosophy, which is at odds with FACE.5
* M.A. Candidate, London School of Economics; J.D., Villanova University; B.A., Villanova
University. This paper contains some excerpts from an article by the author that will appear in a
forthcoming edition of The Catholic Social Science Review (Public and Church Affairs Section).
These excerpts are reprinted with permission.
1. See Gwen Ifill, Clinton Signs Bill Banning Blockades and Violent Acts at Abortion
Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A18.
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 2008).
3. See How Conservative is Judge Roberts?, N.Y. TIMES, September 15, 2005, at A30;
David D. Kirkpatrick, A Year of Work to Sell Roberts to Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2005, at A14; Robin Toner & David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberals and Conservatives Remain Worlds
Apart on Roberts's Suitability, N.Y. TIMES, September 16, 2005, at A22; David D. Kirkpatrick,
Conservatives Scrambling to Prepare for a Tough Fight, N.Y. TIMES, November 1, 2005, at A23;
Judge Alito and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, December 3, 2005, at A18.
4. At one point before his confirmation, NARAL Pro-Choice America ran an advertising
campaign, which they were eventually forced to drop, "that tried to portray Mr. Roberts as
,supporting violent fringe groups' and excusing 'violence against other Americans' because he
once defended the legal right of a convicted bomber to protest outside an abortion clinic." David
D. Kirkpatrick, Abortion Rights Group Revamps Anti-Roberts Ad, N.Y. TIMES, August 27, 2005,
at Al1. However, NARAL's justification for running the ad apparently had nothing to do with
the danger Roberts might pose towards FACE if he was confirmed.
5. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); United States. v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting);
see also Quizzing Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, September 4, 2005, at 9; Jeff Bleich, Michelle
Friedland, & Daniel Powell, The New Chief 66 OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN 18, 22-23 (November
2005); Stephen Labaton, Court Nominee Has Paper Trail Businesses Like, N.Y. TIMES,
November 5, 2005, at Al; Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter?: Conservative Courts in a
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Taking into account the track records of certain long-standing members of
the Supreme Court, as well as the recent changes in the composition of the
Court, the pro-life community's hope that FACE will be invalidated might
actually be realized.
This article begins by looking at the basic underlying principles of the
Commerce Clause, which are essential to understanding how and why the
Roberts Court might find FACE unconstitutional. Next it looks at the Act,
both as it is written and as it has been interpreted by the lower federal
courts. This section also covers the various constitutional challenges that
have been mounted against FACE, with particular emphasis on the debate
surrounding the question of whether the Act was validly enacted under
Congress's Commerce Clause power. Finally, this article considers
whether the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to the
Supreme Court will result in the invalidation of FACE.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."6  While this power is generally viewed as broad, the
Supreme Court has laid out certain relevant parameters. According to
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the activities which are regulated
must have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce-though the effect
need not be direct-and the Congressional legislation can touch nominally
intrastate activities.7 As the Court stated, "[a]lthough activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."8
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court clarified that while an individual's
actions may only minimally affect interstate commerce, he is not exempt
from federal regulation where "his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."9 This legal theory is
known as the aggregation principle or the cumulative impact doctrine,
"under which a single activity that itself has no discernible effect on
interstate commerce may still be regulated if the aggregate effect of that
class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce."'
Conservative Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 675, 676-77 (2006).
6. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
7. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
8. Id. at 37.
9. 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
10. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d
845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999).
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In the 1990s the Rehnquist Court placed further restrictions on
Congress's Commerce Clause power." According to U.S. v. Lopez, in
addition to the substantial effects requirement, the activity being regulated
must be economic in nature for the law to pass constitutional muster. 2 In
finding the statute in question unconstitutional, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that "[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce."' 3  The Lopez decision signaled the Court's willingness to
inquire into congressional purpose. 4 Additionally, the Court seemed to be
concerned about the implication of the government's rationale:
The Government admits, under its "costs of crime" reasoning, that
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities
that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce. Similarly, under the Government's
"national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and
child custody), for example. Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of [the statute], it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 15
In summarizing why the statute at issue in Lopez exceeded Congress'
Commerce power, the Court stressed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act:
ri]s a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms ...[the statute] is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.
16
The Court's willingness to enforce its Commerce Clause standards
continued in U.S. v. Morrison.7 The Morrison Court held that the Violence
11. See, e.g., Stephan E. Oestreicher, Jr., Scheidler Meets Morrison (at the Entrance to a
Health Clinic), 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 693, 698-703 (2002).
12. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. Id. at 551.
14. See id. at 562 ("Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under
the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional
committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce ... the Government concedes that
'[n]either the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding
the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."').
15. Id. at 564.
16. Id. at 561.
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Against Women Act-a statute granting federal relief for those subjected to
violence because of their sex-was unconstitutional. 18 The Court reasoned
that "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic [sic], criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case"' 9 and
that "our decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link between
gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was
attenuated."2 In striking down the law, the Court stated:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic [sic]
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.2 '
The Court stressed,
rwle accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic rsici, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce . . . .The
regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed
at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States.22
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, "[1]ike the Gun-Free School Zones
Act at issue in Lopez, [the statute in Morrison] contains no jurisdictional
element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce." 3 The Court also noted
that congressional findings, by themselves, do not make a regulation
constitutionally licit under the Commerce Clause.24
II. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCEWAYS ACT
FACE provides considerable challenges to pro-life rescues, both in its
statutory language and how it has been interpreted by courts. Enacted in
1994, FACE punishes anyone who:
[b]y force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has
been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services ....5
18. Id.
19. Id. at 610.
20. Id. at 612.
21. Id. at613.
22. Id. at617-18.
23. Id. at613.
24. Id.. at 614.
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a) (1).
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If a rescuer is charged criminally for violating the Act, he faces up to a
$10,000 fine or as much as six months in jail, or both-penalties are harsher
for subsequent violations 26 Courts are divided as to whether defendants are
entitled to a trial by jury in a criminal FACE case.27 Courts have shown
both mercy and harshness in applying FACE. 8
Additionally, if a rescuer faces a civil judgment under FACE, he could
be liable for $5,000.29 The civil suit avenue is also available to the United
States Attorney General,3" who may collect $10,000 in money damages for
an initial rescue and $15,000 for any subsequent rescues.3 Federal courts
seem to be in agreement that the defendants are liable for the statutory
damages in aggregate. 32 To that effect, if a group of pro-life rescuers was
sued by a private party for violating the Act, they would collectively have
to pay a $5,000 penalty for each rescue they carried out, plus additional
costs.
III. FACE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
There have been a number of unsuccessful challenges to the
constitutionality of FACE.33 Its challengers have alleged that the Act
violates several provisions of the Constitution, including the Commerce
Clause34 However, the Fourth,35 Sixth,36 Seventh,37 and Eighth38 Circuits,
26. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(b) ("[a]nd the fine shall, notwithstanding section 3571, be not
more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 18 months, or both, for
a subsequent offense....").
27. See U.S. v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413, 1416 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (holding that two rescuers
were not constitutionally entitled to trial by jury). But see US. v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1419, (D.
Kan. 1995) ("Nevertheless, the court believes the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would hold that
the defendants in this case are entitled to a trial by jury, and this court agrees that it is better to err
on the side of preserving the right to a jury trial.").
28. In US. v. Lynch, two rescuers faced a criminal contempt conviction for breaking the
provisions of the Act. However, the court responded to such a possibility in the following way:
The Court finds both Lynch and Moscinski to be not guilty of criminal contempt. Not
only does their sincere religious belief render their conduct lacking in the willfulness
which criminal contempt requires, but also, the nature of that conduct, which is purely
passive as the videotape shows, and which is at the outermost limits of expressive
conduct that is not constitutionally protected, is so minimally obstructive as to justify
the exercise of the prerogative of leniency. The charge is therefore dismissed.
952 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Conversely, in U.S. v. Mahoney, the court found
sufficient evidence of a FACE violation. 247 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In that case, the direct
action activity consisted of the following: one pro-lifer obstructing an emergency exit that was not
customarily used by abortion staff or customers by kneeling and praying three feet from the door,
others "[kneeling] or [sitting] within five feet of the south door, the main entrance to the [abortion
facility]," and one final pro-life advocate "pacing just behind them." Id. at 283.
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(1)(B).
30. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(2)(A).
31. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(2)(B)(i-ii).
32. See U.S. v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000); US. v. Operation Rescue Nat., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Milwaukee Women's Medical Services, Inc. v. Brock, 2 F. Supp.
2d 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
33. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 801
(Carolina Acad. Press 2006).
34. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp.
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among others,39 have ruled that Congress has acted within its Commerce
Clause powers in enacting FACE. Nevertheless, the contention that the Act
is an illicit application of Congress's Commerce Clause authority is perhaps
the most likely to be accepted by the Supreme Court given its current
configuration. This article will now review the main arguments for and
against the validity of the Act under the Commerce Clause.4"
In Norton v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit set forth the following
argument:
Initially, we find that the Act ... regulates activity ... that has a
direct economic effect . . . . Express congressional findings
underlying the Act plainly demonstrate that violent and obstructive
acts directed at reproductive health facilities resulted in millions of
dollars in damage, forced reproductive health clinics to close,
delayed medical services, and intimidated numerous physicians
from offering abortion services .... While the activity prohibited
by the Act might be motivated by non-commercial sentiment-
namely, staunch moral opposition to abortion-the effect of this
activity is unambiguously and directly economic. Thus, in our
view, such conduct is properly considered commercial activity ....
Congress can properly counter such conduct with legislation
pursuant to the Commerce Clause . . . .In light of the extensive
congressional findings regarding the economically disruptive
effects of clinic blockades and anti-abortion violence, we find that a
formal jurisdictional element is unnecessary because the proscribed
290, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("it is defendants' contention that the Act violates the First, Eighth,
Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and that
Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to pass it.").
35. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 588 (4th Cir. 1997).
36. See Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2002).
37. See U.S. v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996).
38. See U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
39. See U.S. v. Bird, 279 F. Supp. 2d. 827, 828 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (Bird II), order vacated
by, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005) (Bird II1).
40. For contentions in support of the Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, see
Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family after Morrison: An Examination of the Child
Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entranceways Act, and a Federal Law
Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (2002);
Nicole Huberfeld, Note, The Commerce Clause Post-Lopez: It's Not Dead Yet, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 182 (1997); Amy H. Nemko, Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access Under a New Commerce
Clause, 106 YALE L.J. 525, 526 (1996) ("Even if review had been granted, however, it seems
likely that Lopez would pose no threat to the new clinic access law."). For arguments challenging
FACE as a legitimate exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, see Arthur B. Mark, III,
Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: a Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REv. 671, 744
(2004); Steven A. Delchin, Note, Viewing the Constitutionality of the Access Act Through the
Lens of Federalism, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 553 (1997); Anna Kampourakis & Robin C. Tarr,
Note, About F.A.C.E. in the Supreme Court: The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entranceways Act
in Light of Lopez, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 191, 194 (1995) ("The narrow
interpretation given the Commerce Clause in Lopez suggests that FACE may not survive a
challenge to its constitutionality under that clause. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, may
provide Congress with an alternative constitutional justification to sustain the Act."); see also
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Defendant-Appellee, United
States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-20884) (available in electronic database, 2004
WL 3545114 (5th Cir.)) ("PLF Brief').
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activity targets "reproductive health clinics that are, by definition,
directly engaged in the business of providing reproductive health
services." ... Both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House
Committee on Labor and Human Resources submitted extensive
reports detailing that clinic blockades and violent anti-abortion
protests burdened interstate commerce .... Thus, in evaluating the
constitutionality of the Act we are mindful of the informed
judgment of our congressional counterparts .... Given the detailed
congressional record, we are satisfied that Congress had a rational
basis to conclude that the activities prohibited by the Act disrupted
the national market for abortion-related services and decreased the
availability of such services.'"
Other courts have used the Commerce Clause to justify FACE. Finding
that Congress had not overstepped its Commerce Clause boundaries, the
court in Hoffman v. Hunt alleged that direct action activities had a
substantial effect upon the interstate abortion market.42 In U.S. v. Soderna,
the Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the Act sought to remove
serious hindrances to the free movement of goods and citizens across state
borders.43 Additionally, in U.S. v. Hill, the court found that "there is a
rational basis for Congress's determination that the activity the Act
regulates affects interstate commerce . . . . [and] the Act is a reasonable
means of addressing the problems identified by Congress."44
Furthermore, in U.S. v. Gregg, the Third Circuit decided that FACE
meets the substantial effects requirement for valid Commerce Clause
legislation.45 The court specifically distinguished FACE from the statute at
issue in Morrison: "[I]n contrast to gender-motivated crime, the activity
regulated by FACE... is activity with an effect that is economic in nature.
Reproductive health clinics are income-generating businesses that employ
physicians and other staff to provide services and goods to their patients. '"46
The Gregg court submitted that the main aim of pro-lifers violating FACE
was to disrupt the operations of abortion facilities and prevent potential
customers from buying their services. 47  The Gregg court supported its
conclusion by citing congressional studies finding rescuers' activities had
resulted in substantial monetary damage, abortion facility closings, delayed
abortions, and the refusal of abortionists to commit abortions.48 The court
concluded:
41. 298 F.3d at 556-59 (citations omitted).
42. 126 F.3d at 582-89. In holding that FACE was a licit exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, it seems as if Riely v. Reno even alluded to the antiquated "stream of commerce"
theory. 860 F. Supp. 693, 707 (D.Ariz. 1994).
43. See 82 F.3d at 1373-74. According to the court, "The fact that the motive for the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act was not to increase the gross national product by
removing a barrier to free trade, but rather to protect personal safety and property rights, is
irrelevant." Id at 1374.
44. 893 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
45. 226 F.3d 253, (3d Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 262.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The effect of the conduct proscribed by FACE is to deter, and in
some cases to stop completely, the commercial activity of
providing reproductive health services. We thus hold that although
the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a central
role in whether a law is valid under the Commerce Clause, we hold
that economic activity can be understood in broad terms. Pursuant
to this principle, unlike the activity prohibited by VAWA, the
misconduct regulated by FACE, although not motivated by
commercial concerns, has an effect which is, at its essence,
economic.49
In an Eighth Circuit case, U.S. v. Dinwiddie, the court asserted, "if
Planned Parenthood of Greater Kansas City, its staff, or its patients are 'in
interstate commerce,' FACE's protection of them from Mrs. Dinwiddie's
disruptive activities is a valid exercise of the commerce power."5 The
court submitted that this condition was satisfied, and that therefore the Act
was licit under the Commerce Clause." "Planned Parenthood has a number
of patients and staff who do not reside in Missouri and who, therefore,
engage in interstate commerce when they obtain or provide reproductive-
health services."" Additionally, the court noted a significant amount of
women travel between states to procure abortions, pointing out that the
abortion facility in question was situated in a metropolitan area spread out
over more than one state. 3 Finally, the court defended the constitutionality
of the Act by contending, "[I]n addition to having the power to protect
those of Planned Parenthood's staff and patients who are 'in interstate
commerce,' Congress also has the power to protect Planned Parenthood."54
A recent federal district court case finding FACE unconstitutional is
United States v. Bird (Bird If). " Bird II's rationale, as well as the dissent
issued upon Bird II's appellate reversal in Bird III,56 serve as examples for
finding the Act violates the Commerce Clause. In Bird II, the district court
held that, in enacting FACE, Congress had overstepped the bounds of its
Commerce Clause authority. Specifically, it found that the Act focused on
activity that was both non-economic and intrastate in nature, which prima
facie is not allowed under the Commerce Clause.57 Additionally, the court
held that the Act failed to satisfy the substantial effects test, which
49. Id.
50. 76 F.3d at 919.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 279 F. Supp. 2d 827. The defendant in Bird II was Frank Lafayette Bird, who was
charged with violating face when he allegedly used an automobile to damage a Planned
Parenthood facility in Houston, Texas. This case is referred to as "Bird F' because the defendant,
Frank Lafayette Bird had previously been found to have violated FACE in 1994, when he threw a
bottle at an abortionist's car as he attempted to enter a Houston area abortion facility. See United
States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1997) (known as Bird I).
56. Bird ll, 401 F.3d at 634 (DeMoss, dissenting).
57. BirdIl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
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legitimizes congressional action that might otherwise be considered the
province of the states. 8
As a preliminary matter, the court pointed out that "while the abortion
business is economic in nature, the conduct of Bird and the activities sought
to be circumscribed are not."59  It also noted that, ironically, pro-life
activism had in fact helped interstate commerce. Normally, abortion is an
intrastate activity, however, Congress found "that doctors and patients
travel from state to state because of anti-abortion activities."6  Thus,
rescues helped create an interstate market for a service that would otherwise
have remained intrastate; they decidedly did not obstruct interstate
commerce." The district court concluded that "the aggregation analysis
does not support a reverse impact on interstate commerce, which commerce
is not illegal. 62
Next, the district court dismissed the idea that an activity is interstate in
nature merely because economic activity goes on inside an abortion facility,
nor did pro-life activism become interstate because it occurred around such
a facility.63 Instead, the court concluded that "[t]he fact that a person may
travel across state lines to an abortion clinic for convenience, privacy or
availability, does not alter the fact that the activity [i.e. a rescue] is
intrastate and has, at most an insubstantial or attenuated affect on interstate
commerce."'  The court explicitly denied Congress the right to decide
whether a specific activity passes the substantial effects test.
The district court was also persuaded by the fact that FACE did not
contain "an express jurisdictional element," which would have limited the
application of the statute to those persons "whose activities would have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."65 This factor
figured in the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Lopez.66
Furthermore, the Act was not designed to regulate some bigger economic
activity which is itself crucial to interstate commerce. 67 Additionally, the
court found salient that FACE's goal was "at most a general regulatory
58. Bird II, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 836. The district court stressed that "Even if the activities
prohibited by [FACE] are considered under the aggregation theory, it does not strengthen the
relationship between the statute's prohibitions and the Commerce Clause .... Here, as in Lopez
and Morrison, the analysis consists of too many inferences and leaps in constitutional logic to
reach congressional authority to regulate this activity under the Commerce Clause." Id at 831 n.7.
59. Id. at 829 n.4.
60. Id. at 835.
61. Id. at 836 ("Specifically, there is no interstate economic market for abortion clinic
services except that identified as created by anti-abortionist [sic]; and congressional findings do
not support a different conclusion.").
62. Id. at 835.
63. Id. at 836.
64. Id. Hoyt made the further point that "there is no defined interstate criminal activity. All
of the activity occurs within state lines." Id.
65. Id.
66. 514 U.S. 549.
67. Bird II, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
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purpose that fails to establish any substantial relationship to a commercial
activity."68 The district court summarized:
The regulated activity is noneconomic rsic] criminal conduct that is
allegedly perpetuated at a local level. While doctors and abortion
clinics engage in commerce at some level, that commerce was not
the object of Congress' regulatory purpose. As observed earlier,
enforcement of the Act has the effect of reducing interstate
commerce activity. Certainly, Congress has passed legislation
before that might arguably have as its purpose the reduction of
interstate commerce activity. However, such as it was, the
legislation was generally designed to prevent interference in or with
Congress' regulation of a larger economic activity. Here, there is no
larger regulated economic activity. In fact, there is no evidence in
Congress' findings that the Houston clinic ever served anyone
outside the boundaries of the city of Houston. Moreover, the
government conceded in rBird's first FACE casel that there was no
rational basis for finding that anti-abortion activities substantially
affected interstate commerce, except by aggregation.69
Finding FACE unconstitutional, the district court ordered the
government's indictment against Bird be dismissed with prejudice.
In the wake of Bird II, the government appealed the decision to the
Fifth Circuit. In 2005 the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision
only insofar as it struck down the Act.7" In a brief opinion, written by
Judge Garza,7 the court ruled that "[w]e do not find that the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison materially affects our holding in Bird I. Our
decision in that case is therefore binding."72 The court pointed out that,
after Morrison, both the Third Circuit in Gregg and the Sixth Circuit in
Norton, had also concluded that FACE was a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power.73 No circuits have sided with the view that the
Morrison ruling invalidated the Act. The appellate court found it
immaterial that Bird I and Bird III dealt with different subsections of
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bird 111, 401 F.3d at 634.
71. This fact is perhaps especially surprising considering that Judge Garza has been
mentioned as a possible "pro-life" candidate for the Supreme Court. See Steven Ertelt, President
Bush Looking Into Possible Supreme Court Picks, LifeNews.com (May 30, 2005),
http://www.lifenews.com/natl352.html (May 30, 2005) (last visited Jul. 22, 2005). Garza has
criticized the Supreme Court's approach to abortion in previous cases. See Sojourner T v.
Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (Garza, concurring); Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub,
109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza, concurring). If he is indeed "pro-life," it makes Bird X all
the more frustrating for pro-life direct action participants, considering that the case was decided 2-
1 and a pro-life result could have certainly been derived through plausible legal analysis.
72. Bird III, 401 F.3d at 634.
73. Id. at 634 n. 1. This fact was not convincing to the dissent: "While the Government may
be correct in its argument that each circuit court to have addressed this issue has upheld FACE as
a constitutional exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, it is critical to point
out that only two circuits have engaged in such an analysis post-Morrison." Id. at 634 n.1
(DeMoss, dissenting).
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FACE.74 The court vacated and remanded Bird H so it could be decided
according to the principles laid down by Bird 111.75
Judge Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., who had refused to join in Bird I's ruling
that the Act is constitutional,76 again issued a strong dissent in Bird IL 77
He stressed that the activity criminalized by the Act is intrastate, non-
economic, and non-commercial in nature.78 He also noted that Congress
admitted that there are state criminal laws that effectively cover FACE-type
activity.79 Judge DeMoss charged that "[b]ecause Congress does not have a
general police power; it surely cannot have the authority to define as
criminal conduct under federal law private acts that are intended to interfere
with another person's exercise of some constitutional right. . .. ""
The dissent next responded to the claim that "criminal, intrastate
activity [that] is neither commercial nor economic in nature . . . can be
aggregated in order to create a substantial effect on interstate commerce. " 81
Judge DeMoss viewed this argument as the crux of Bird L82 He argued that
Bird I was in fact invalidated by Morrison, since, in that case, the Supreme
Court ruled that "aggregation of noncommercial, criminal" intrastate
conduct is not allowed as a valid Commerce Clause contention. The dissent
also believed that Morrison rendered FACE unconstitutional.83 Judge
DeMoss' dissent closed with a searching critique of the majority's position:
In sum, FACE, as interpreted now in light of Morrison, represents
another effort by Congress to dismantle the federalist foundation
upon which this country was designed to function. The regulation
of purely intrastate, noneconomic, noncommercial criminal activity
that is not essential to a broader regulatory scheme surely cannot be
within Congress's purview. To uphold the constitutionality of this
statute in the face of the teachings provided by Lopez and Morrison
not only ignores the precedents established by both of these
decisions, but also essentially grants to Congress the unfettered
authority to govern in areas the Framers contemplated would be
regulated only by the states. Because I believe the Constitution and
the Supreme Court disallow the result reached by the majority's
holding, I respectfully dissent. 4
In his dissent to the Third Circuit's decision in Gregg, Judge Weis
addressed the fact that the lower federal courts have overwhelmingly found
74. Id. at 634 n.2.
75. Id. at 634.
76. See Bird I, 124 F.3d at 692 (DeMoss, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See Bird III, 401 F.3d at 634-37 (DeMoss, dissenting).
78. Id. at 635 (DeMoss, dissenting). The dissent made the point that the Fifth Circuit had
already accepted the fact that the proscribed conduct of FACE was not commercial in nature. Id.
at 636 (DeMoss, dissenting).
79. Id. (DeMoss, dissenting).
80. Id. (DeMoss, dissenting).
81. Id. (DeMoss, dissenting).
82. Id. at 637 (DeMoss, dissenting).
83. Id. 636-37 (DeMoss, dissenting).
84. Id. at 637 (DeMoss, dissenting).
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FACE constitutional and indicated the significance of Morrison to this
factual pattern: "Although the Courts of Appeals opinions considered
Lopez, they essentially treated it as a narrow holding that did not affect
measures such as FACE. Doubts that Lopez had application beyond its
unique factual setting, however, were dissipated by the expansive holding
in [Morrison]."5 He also made the point that, while an abortion facility is
indubitably involved in commerce, as demonstrated by the money
transactions that take place within its walls, the actors targeted by the Act
are by the very terms of the regulation external to the facility's operations.
8 6
"Although blockades may reduce a clinic's revenue, the prohibited conduct
is fundamentally criminal in nature and does not fit easily within the
category of commercial activity. The fact that criminal conduct may also
have financial effects does not transform that activity into one commercial
in nature."87 Citing Morrison, Judge Weis reminded his fellow judges that
the nature of the regulated conduct is ascertained by an analysis of the
conduct itself, not by outside factors such as economic effect, which are a
degree removed from the legislation's focus. 88
The dissent also criticized the congressional findings associated with
FACE as a source of the constitutionality of the Act:
As the basis for concluding that blockades have a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce, Congress reasoned that obstructions that
deter patients from going to a clinic caused diminished business for
the enterprise. In some cases, when clinics closed, women were
required to travel, perhaps interstate, to obtain the services of
another establishment. This is the very same "but-for causal chain"
of logic that the Court explicitly rejected in Morrison .... If every
attenuated effect upon interstate commerce stemming from an
occurrence of violent crime satisfied the substantial effects test,
then Congress could "regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption." . . . The
opinions of the Courts of Appeals that have upheld FACE all rely
heavily on the legislative history for concluding that a substantial
effect on interstate commerce existed .... But these decisions are
undercut by Morrison. With the asserted justifications
constitutionally infirm, the legislative history does little to
demonstrate a reasonable congressional judgment that the
prohibited activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 89
85. Gregg, 226 F.3d at 268 (Weis, dissenting).
86. Id. at 269-70 (Weis, dissenting).
87. Id. at 270 (Weis, dissenting) ("Murder and robbery have monetary consequences, but that
does not transform criminal codes into commercial regulation.").
88. Id. (Weis, dissenting).
89. Id. at 271-72 (Weis, dissenting). Others have contended that certain parts of the
congressional findings were factually incorrect. "Congress claimed FACE was needed because
there was a nationwide conspiracy to commit violence against abortion providers .... However,
the federal government itself found no evidence of such a conspiracy." PLF Brief supra note 42,
at 17.
No. 1] Beautiful Winds of Change 65
IV. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS RELATING TO
FACE
In addition to the Commerce Clause challenges to FACE, the Act has
also been confronted on other constitutional grounds. The court in U.S. v.
McMillan concluded that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided
the necessary authorization for Congress's passage of the Act.9" Federal
courts have held FACE valid, despite claims that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,91 the Eight Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment92 and excessive fines,93 and
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.94 In U.S. v. Unterburger,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Act did not run into Tenth Amendment
trouble.95 In Hoffman, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an
argument that FACE violated the First Amendment free speech rights of
pro-life activists.96  In U.S. v. Weslin, the court reached the same
conclusion: "Many courts have noted that the Act furthers several important
or substantial governmental interests .... FACE is also unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.... I also find that the incidental restrictions
imposed by FACE on First Amendment freedoms are sufficiently
narrow."
97
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that FACE was not
unconstitutionally vague,9" while the D.C. Circuit Court dismissed a charge
90. See 946 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
91. See U.S. v. Brock, 863 F.Supp. 851, 861 n.19 (E.D. Wis. 1994), aJfd, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("[O]n its face, the statute applies equally to activities directed at the patients and staff
of abortion clinics and the patients and staff of centers that counsel women against abortion and in
favor of its alternatives."). In Riely, the court stated that "Moreover, even if Mosley was
applicable in this case and a heightened standard of scrutiny was to be applied, the Court finds
that FACE is narrowly tailored and that, in light of its legislative history, its objectives are
legitimate. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim must fail." 860 F. Supp. at 706.
92. See Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 706. In Riely, the court submitted the following:
The Court finds that the harshness of the penalties provided is commensurate with the
gravity of the proscribed conduct. The Court also notes that the federal criminal code
contains numerous comparable penalty provisions for crimes involving threats of
violence and the infliction of bodily iniury. Finally, the Court finds it important that
FACE affords a sentencing court much discretion in determining the actual sentence
imposed.
Id.
93. See Walton, 949 F. Supp. at 294.
94. See U.S. v. Weslin, 964 F. Supp. 83, 87(W.D. N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir.
1998).
95. 97 F.3d at 1415 (citing Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (1 th Cir. 1995)).
96. 126 F.3d at 588-89.
97. 964 F. Supp. at 86.
98. See U.S. v. Balint, 201 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing idea that Act does not
provide adequate warning that Act's proscription applies to rescues that commence both before
and after abortion facility opens); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1429
(S.D. Cal. 1994) ("[N]ot only does FACE include specific definitions for such key terms as
'intimidate,' 'interfere,' and 'physical obstruction,' most of the operative words come from other
statutes which the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have construed and found not
unconstitutionally vague."). In U.S. v. Scott, the court found that FACE spoke "'in clear, common
words,' [and] defin[ed] many of its terms so as to 'inform those opposed to abortion that they will
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that the Act was overbroad.99 In U.S. v. Wilson, the Seventh Circuit ruled
that First Amendment protected speech was not illicitly targeted by
FACE. 0  In US. v. Lucero, in response to the contention that the
"defendant engaged in expressive conduct, intended to communicate his
view that legal abortion denies justice to the unborn," the court stated that
"criminal conduct is not rendered protected speech in a given case merely
because the actor intended to send a message, political or otherwise."' 0 '
U.S. v. Dinwiddie concluded that the Act was not "an impermissible
content-based restriction on speech."'0 2 Finally, in Cook v. Reno, the court
did not find any merit in the contention that FACE was passed "to
eliminate, or at least chill," pro-life direct action events. 3 The Supreme
Court has refused to hear any case concerning the constitutionality of the
Act. 104
not offend this law by peaceful, non-obstructive [protest]."' 958 F. Supp 761, 779 (D. Conn.
1997) (citing American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 653 (4th Cir. 1995)).
99. See Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Terry, the court discarded the
overbreadth argument that FACE "criminalizes 'threats' that the person who is uttering the
'threat' will harm himself if another person obtains or provides an abortion" and that its
"definition of 'intimidation' would also include the 'harm' of increased medical risk-a harm
abortion advocates claim is inherent in any delay or denial of abortion ..... Id. at 1421
(emphasis in original).
100. 154 F.3d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1998).
101. 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing U. S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968)).
102. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921; see US. v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 866 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
("In short, FACE is a content-neutral statute that (1) is narrowly tailored and (2) leaves anti-
abortion protesters with ample alternative means of communicating their message... it does not
violate the First Amendment."). Riely asserted that:
The Court disagrees that FACE regulates protected speech or protected, expressive
conduct. FACE merely regulates pure conduct (i.e., force or acts of physical obstruction
that injure, intimidate or interfere with another's freedom of movement) and
unprotected speech (i.e., threats). Plaintiffs have failed to cite, and this Court's own
research has failed to find, any authority for the proposition that the First Amendment
doctrine proscribing content- and viewpoint-based regulation applies to the regulation
of such unexpressive conduct and unprotected speech.
860 F. Supp. at 700-01. In Brock, the court considered, and rejected, the following argument:
The defendants also object to FACE's reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE,
"intimidat[ion]" is defined as that conduct which "place[s] a person in reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another." 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3). The
defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on
the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I
disagree. The "reasonable apprehension" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable
attempt to limit application of the statute to "true threats."
863 F. Supp at 857 n.7.
103. 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. La. 1994); see Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374-77 (rejecting
argument that "the Act's real aim and likely effect are to deter the expression of a particular point
of view, namely opposition to abortion"); see also Walton, 949 F. Supp. at 293 ("Given this, I am
confident that Congress' purpose was not to discriminate against a particular idea, but to prohibit
particular conduct.").
104. See, e.g., Bird v. US., 546 U.S. 864 (2005) (denying certiorari to case where
constitutionality of FACE was questioned).
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FACE has been subjected to a variety of policy-based criticisms. °5 It is
not the purpose of this paper to substantially review them. However, a
basic understanding of these criticisms is instructive because it shows that
the Act has been attacked even by those who do not fully support the idea
of the pro-life rescue. This is demonstrated by the remarks of Michael W.
McConnell, now a Judge for the Tenth Circuit, about U.S. v. Lynch, 10 6 a
criminal contempt FACE case:
It is utterly incredible that Lynch and Moscinski might be sent to
prison for six months for praying in a driveway. If they had been in
that driveway for some other reason (a labor dispute, for example),
or if they had committed the same sort of protest at another kind of
business (a fur store, for example, or a CIA recruiting office), they
would have gotten off with a slap on the wrist, had they been
punished at all. The Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act singles
out a particular kind of protest for penalties unheard-of in the
history of American political protest movements. Lynch and
Moscinski were not tried for the actual harm they caused. As Judge
Sprizzo noted, the "obstructive" effect of their quiet protest was
"minimal." The prosecutor who sought to imprison Lynch and
Moscinski was not asking for impartial justice, but for repression of
political dissent. Lynch and Moscinski should have been punished
for the acts they committed. They should not have been spared
because their cause was just. But they also should not be punished
more severely because their cause is unpopular. They should have
been charged with trespassing on private property, and given the
same punishment that is meted out to others who commit that
offense in that jurisdiction with comparable damage. I'd guess a
fifty-dollar fine would be about right.
°7
V. WILL THE ROBERTS COURT INVALIDATE FACE?
In order to answer this important question, it is necessary to briefly
review the relevant Supreme Court decisions affecting abortion protest. In
1988, the Court in Frisby v. Schultz considered the constitutionality of a
Wisconsin town ordinance making it "unlawful for any person to engage in
105. See e.g., Note, Safety Valve Closed: The Removal of Nonviolent Outlets for Dissent and
the Onset of Anti-Abortion Violence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (2000) (suggesting a link between
passage of FACE and killings of abortionists); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-life Free
Speech: a Lesson From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REv. 853, 885 (1999) (contending that the
Act "has the potential to severely chill legitimate pro-life free speech"); DELLAPENNA, supra note
35, at 804 ("In sum, proponents of abortion sought [through FACE and other means] to imprison
or to ruin financially all with the temerity to oppose abortion through any means that might have
some actual effect on the provision of the services.").
106. 952 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
107. Michael W. McConnell, Breaking the Law, Bending the Law, 74 FIRST THINGS 13, 15
(June/July 1997). Elsewhere, McConnell has argued that FACE is probably unconstitutional. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitutionality of the Clinic
Access Bill, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 261 (1994).
picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual."'' 8
The local municipal body enacted the law in response to the picketing of an
abortionist's home by pro-life protestors." 9 The pro-life protestors, after
threats by the town of arrest and prosecution, challenged the ordinance on
First Amendment grounds."0 Rejecting this challenge, Justice 0' Connor
summarized the Court's reasoning as follows:
Because the picketing prohibited by the Brookfield ordinance is
speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling
to receive it, the State has a substantial and justifiable interest in
banning it. The nature and scope of this interest make the ban
narrowly tailored. The ordinance also leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication and is content neutral. Thus, largely
because of its narrow scope, the facial challenge to the ordinance
must fail.'''
In a 1993 case, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, the
Supreme Court addressed the use of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Act by pro-
abortionists against rescue groups."2 The issue addressed by the Court was
"whether the first clause of Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)-the
surviving version of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-provides a federal
cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. ' 13
The KKK Act specifically "provides, in pertinent part, that '[i]f two or
more persons ... conspire or go in disguise on the highway or... premises
of another, for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons
of. . . equal protection ... or ... privileges and immunities,' the injured
party may recover 'against any one or more of the conspirators."" 114 In an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court gave a clear answer:
Trespassing upon private property is unlawful in all States, as is, in
many States and localities, intentionally obstructing the entrance to
private premises. These offenses may be prosecuted criminally
under state law, and may also be the basis for state civil damages.
They do not, however, give rise to a federal cause of action simply
because their objective is to prevent the performance of abortions,
any more than they do so (as we have held) when their objective is
to stifle free speech." 5
The Court's ruling deprived pro-abortion forces of one of the main
weapons in the struggle against pro-life activists. While Bray significantly
undercut pro-abortion efforts to secure access to federal courts, rescue cases
decided under state law may give rise to federal jurisdiction under the legal
108. 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988).
109. Id. at 476-77.
110. Id. at477.
Ill. Idat488.
112. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
113. /d at 266.
114. Sue Mota, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: Abortion Protestors are not
Liable under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 35 CATH. LAW. 381, 382 (1994).
115. 1dat286.
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doctrine of pendent jurisdiction." 6 Furthermore, federal courts disagree as
to the proper interpretation of Bray."7 Some have outright dismissed KKK
Act claims against rescuers," 8 while others allow pro-abortion forces the
chance to prove their case in light of what the Court stated in Bray."9 Thus,
while the situation is not entirely clear, one can confidently say that it is
now considerably more difficult, if not impossible, for pro-abortionists to
bring a KKK Act cause of action pursuant to a rescue.
In the 1994 case, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler
(Scheidler I), the Court ruled that a RICO claim did not require an
economic motive as to "either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate
acts of racketeering . *.".."',, This decision allowed the National
Organization for Women's (NOW) suit to proceed against Scheidler and his
116. See, e.g., Women's Health Care Serv., P.A. v. Operation Rescue, 24 F.3d 107, 110 (10th
Cir. 1994). Pendent jurisdiction is "A court's jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim over
which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction, because the claim arises from the same transaction
or occurrence as another claim that is properly before the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856
(7th Ed. Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999).
117. See Carolyn J. Lockwood, Comment, Regulating the Abortion Clinic Battleground: Will
Free Speech be the Ultimate Casualty?, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 995, 1006 (1995).
118. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 816 F.Supp. 729 (D. D.C.
1993). The court ruled:
The Supreme Court holding in Bray, supra, that section 1985(3) does not create a cause
of action against persons blocking access to abortion clinics invalidates the section
1985(3) ground for the Injunction. Defendants argue that the Bray decision ousts this
Court's jurisdiction over the entire case. However, the principle of pendent iurisdiction
preserves the Court's continued jurisdiction over the injunction against D.C. law
violations and sustains the Court's power and duty to enforce its orders.
Id. at 731. While parts of this decision were later overruled, the jurisdictional conclusion quoted
above was left untouched. See Nat ' Org. for Women, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 651
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
119. See, e.g., Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1993).
The court stated in relevant part:
To the extent that appellants are contending that Bray forecloses all resort to § 1985(3)
in all instances involving "persons obstructing access to abortion clinics," we think
appellants have over-read what the Court announced. To be sure, the Court in Bray
held, with respect to the animus ingredient of § 1985(3), that (1) women seeking
abortions do not constitute a class protected by § 1985(3), and (2), if women in general
constitute a class protected by the statute-a question the Court found no need to
answer-"the claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus against
women in general must be rejected." . . . But we are of the view that the Court's
analysis of the animus aspect of Bray is tied to the facts there adduced-"[tlhe record in
this case,"... "[gliven this record." ... Accordingly, we think that an assessment of
the animus aspect of the case at bar requires a further review, in the light of the legal
principles relating to animus announced in Bray, of the record evidence bearing on
appellants' motivation.
In similar fashion, a determination of whether appellants intended to and did inhibit a
right protected by § 1985(3)-either the Fourteenth Amendment abortion right,
protected against the state; or the citizenship right to travel without public or private
impediment--calls for scrutiny of the instant record through the prism of the Bray
Court's pronouncement that "impairment [of the right] must be a conscious objective of
the enterprise."
Id. at 1048 (citations omitted).
120. 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994). For a review of the main events of this lengthy case through
2005, see Nat'! Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 396 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Scheidler V); Nat'! Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, Pro-Life Action League,
http://www.prolifeaction.org/nvs/index.htm (last visited Jul. 20, 2005).
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fellow pro-lifers.' 2 ' However, in 2003, in Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc. (Scheidler III), the Court held: "[B]ecause
we find that petitioners did not obtain or attempt to obtain property from
respondents, we conclude that there was no basis upon which to find that
they committed extortion under the Hobbs Act."'' 2  The Court went on to
state:
Because petitioners did not obtain or attempt to obtain respondents'
property, both the state extortion claims and the claim of attempting
or conspiring to commit state extortion were fatally flawed. The 23
violations of the Travel Act and 23 acts of attempting to violate the
Travel Act also fail. These acts were committed in furtherance of
allegedly extortionate conduct. But we have already determined
that petitioners did not commit or attempt to commit extortion.
Because all of the predicate acts supporting the jury's finding of a
RICO violation must be reversed, the judgment that petitioners
violated RICO must also be reversed. Without an underlying RICO
violation, the injunction issued by the District Court must
necessarily be vacated. We therefore need not address the second
question presented-whether a private plaintiff in a civil RICO
action is entitled to injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1964.123
The 8-1 ruling was generally viewed as a victory for pro-life
activists.'2 4 However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the district court level to resolve the following dispute:
On remand to this court, the parties submitted Statements of
Position pursuant to Circuit Rule 54. Plaintiffs argue that, although
the Court in rScheidler III] disposed of the 117 extortion-based
predicate acts under RICO, the defendants did not petition for a
writ of certiorari on the four predicate acts involving "acts or
threats of physical violence to any person or property" and,
accordingly, the Court did not decide whether these acts alone
could support the district court's injunction. In response, defendants
contend that the Hobbs Act does not outlaw "physical violence"
apart from extortion and robbery, and therefore the Supreme
Court's holding that the defendants did not commit extortion
precludes a finding that the four acts or threats of violence might
independently support the injunction.' 5
In response to petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed its February 2004 decision.'26
121. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2001) (Scheidler
1).
122. 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003).
123. Id. at410-11.
124. See, e.g., Sue Ann Mota, Scheidler v. NOW: The Supreme Court Holds that Abortion
Protestors are not Racketeers, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 139 (2004); Eric J. Scheidler, Scheidler
Victory in the Supreme Court, Pro-Life Action League,
http://www.prolifeaction.org/nowvscheidler/victory.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
125. Scheidler V, 396 F.3d at 810 (quoting Nat7 Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 91
Fed.Appx. 510, 512 (2004) (Scheidler IV) (unpublished order)).
126. Scheidler V, 396 F.3d at 817.
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In 2005, the Supreme Court agreed to definitively answer the Scheidler
V's lingering questions.1 27 In an unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito did
not participate), Court held unequivocally "that Congress did not intend to
create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act .... The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded
for entry of judgment for petitioners.' '128 This case ended any possibility of
using civil RICO against pro-life protestors.
Since the 1994 enactment of FACE, the Court has decided three other
cases that bear directly on pro-life activism. In Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc. 29 and Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of Western New York, 3'
the Court considered two injunctions, one state and one federal, that had
been issued against pro-life activists. In both cases, the majority upheld
some provisions of the injunction in question, while striking down others.'
Specifically, in Madsen, the Court held the following:
In sum, we uphold the noise restrictions and the 36-foot buffer zone
around the clinic entrances and driveway because they burden no
more speech than necessary to eliminate the unlawful conduct
targeted by the state court's injunction. We strike down as
unconstitutional the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the private
property to the north and west of the clinic, the "images
observable" provision, the 300-foot no-approach zone around the
clinic, and the 300-foot buffer zone around the residences, because
these provisions sweep more broadly than necessary to accomplish
the permissible goals of the injunction. 132
In Schenck, the Court stated: "We uphold the provisions imposing
'fixed bubble' or 'fixed buffer zone' limitations . . . but hold that the
provisions imposing 'floating bubble' or 'floating buffer zone' limitations
violate the First Amendment."' 33 However, in 2000, pro-life direct action
participants suffered an unqualified loss in Hill v. Colorado, where the
Court upheld a state statute making it a crime to:
knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such
person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the
127. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 545 U.S. 1151 (2005) (Scheidler VI); see
Operation Rescue v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 545 U.S. 1151 (2005). Of particular importance
to the Rescue Movement, NOW's appellate brief made it clear that the "4 acts or threats of
physical violence" at issue do not refer to "sit-ins and demonstrations." Respondents' Brief in
Opposition at 5, 6, Scheidler v. Nat'I Org.for Women, Inc., 545 U.S. 1151 (2005) (No. 04-1244).
Thus, even before the decision was handed down, it appeared to informed observers that peaceful
rescues could no longer be grounds for RICO liability.
128. Scheidler v. Nat'! Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 23. 1264, 1274 (2006) (Scheidler
ViI).
129. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
130. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
131. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361.
132. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
133. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361.
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public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet
from any entrance door to a health care facility.'34
The case law discussed in this article raises speculation about the
outcome of a case challenging the constitutionality of FACE that reaches
the Supreme Court. Both Lopez and Morrison were decided 5-4."' If the
Court agreed to hear such a matter, assuming that there are no other
changes in Court personnel in the wake of Justice O'Connor's retirement
and Chief Justice Rehnquist's death,'36 three members of the Lopez and
Morrison majorities would still be on the bench: Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy. Scalia and Kennedy both joined the majority in Frisby,13 7
while Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
unanimous opinion in Scheidler 1.138 However, Scalia wrote the majority
opinion in Bray (in which Thomas, Rehnquist and Kennedy joined),'39 and
Kennedy noted in his concurrence that "even if, after proceedings on
remand, the ultimate result is dismissal of the action, local authorities retain
the right and the ability to request federal assistance, should they deem it
warranted."'40
Furthermore, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy voted in accordance with
pro-life direct action interests in Madsen 4' and Schenck,'42 dissented in
Hill,'43 and sided with the pro-life activists in Scheidler III and Scheidler
VII.'" These justices have shown concern for direct action pro-life
participants in other cases as well. For example, in 1997, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to a California abortion protest case.'45 Justice
Scalia dissented to this decision and was joined by Justices Thomas and
Kennedy.'46 According to Justice Scalia, the case involved activities "so
devoid of threatening physical confrontation it would make an old-
fashioned union organizer blush. Yet the trial court entered-and the
Supreme Court of California approved-an injunction severely curtailing
134. 530 U.S. 703, 707 n.1 (2000). Clearly, this statute makes it considerably more difficult
to sidewalk counsel.
135. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
136. See Richard W. Stevenson, O'Connor to Retire, Touching Off Battle Over Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of Supreme
Court, Is Dead at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 138.
137. See 487 U.S. at 475.
138. See 510 U.S. at 250. In that case, Justice Kennedy also joined in Justice Souter's
concurring opinion, which stated "I join the Court's opinion and write separately to explain why
the First Amendment does not require reading an economic-motive requirement into the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.. .and to stress that the Court's opinion does
not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in particular cases." Id. at 263
(Souter, J., concurring).
139. See 506 U.S. at 265.
140. Id. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. See 512 U.S. at 756.
142. See 519 U.S. at 360.
143. See 530 U.S. at 705.
144. See 537 U.S. at 395; 547 U.S. at 12.
145. See Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997).
146. Id. at 1133-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the speech rights of clinic protesters in a public forum." '147 Moreover, in the
dissent's view, the lower court in the case had purposefully disregarded the
relevant Supreme Court precedents.'48  Justice Scalia advocated for
"grant[ing] the petition for certiorari, summarily revers[ing] the judgment
of the Supreme Court of California, and remand[ing] for further
proceedings."' 49 Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented to the denial of
certiorari in another abortion protest case in 2000.' 50
Considering the sum of the evidence, one can cautiously predict that
those three justices would invalidate FACE. However, while Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy supported restrictions on the Commerce Clause in
Lopez and Morrison,'5 ' those same justices split over a Commerce Clause
question in Gonzales v. Raich.'52 Some commentators have interpreted the
latter case as a substantial defeat for federalism.'53 In Raich, the Court, per
Justice Stevens, ruled that the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") was
valid, even though it banned the intrastate production and ownership of
marijuana that was used for medical reasons under state law'54 (Kennedy
147. Id. at 1135 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 1134 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 528 U.S. 1099, 1099 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia, who authored the dissent, explained his rationale as follows:
Although in my judgment the scope of the injunction is unconstitutionally broad insofar
as it prohibits approaching any physician or any vehicle containing a physician, and
prohibits any noise that can be heard inside the clinic during any of its business hours..
. there would be nothing about this case warranting our attention if the judgment were
based upon, and the scope of the injunction determined by, unlawful acts committed by
petitioners. The First Amendment is not a license for lawlessness, and when abortion
protesters engage in such acts as trespassing upon private property and deliberately
obstructing access to clinics, they are accountable to the law. What makes the present
case remarkable, however, and establishes it as a terrifying deterrent to legitimate,
peaceful First Amendment activity throughout South Carolina, is the fact that the South
Carolina Supreme Court's affirmance did not rest upon its determination that there was
adequate evidence of unlawful activity.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
152. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
153. See Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rides After Gonzales v.
Raich, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 113, 113 (2005-2006) ("The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in
Gonzales v. Raich severely undermined hopes that the Court might enforce meaningful
constitutional limits on congressional power."). Ernest A. Young, the Judge Benjamin Harrison
Powell Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin, has written:
Most assessments of Chief Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudential legacy have placed
federalism firmly at its center. And yet, a full decade after the Court's revival of limits
on the commerce power in United States v Lopez, grave doubts remain about the
Chief's "Federalist Revival.."... The doubts upon which I wish to focus here, however,
go to the seriousness of the Court's enterprise. That seriousness might be doubted on
two distinct grounds . . . . [Olthers have argued that the Court's federalism
jurisprudence is unsustainable, that is, either that the doctrinal formulations employed
are incapable of rolling national power back any significant distance, or that the Court
simply lacks the resolve to take its federalism very far. Last Term's decision in
Gonzales v. Raich put the Court's seriousness to the test along both these dimensions..
. [T]he Rehnquist Court... in so holding.., invited-and received-vigorous questions
about its seriousness in federalism cases.
Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke?: Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-3 (2005).
154. 545 U.S. at 15-33.
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joined the majority's opinion).'55 Scalia concurred in the Court's judgment,
though not with Justice Steven's opinion.'56 Scalia explained his position as
follows: "In the CSA, Congress has undertaken to extinguish the interstate
market in Schedule I controlled substances, including marijuana. The
Commerce Clause unquestionably permits this. The power to regulate
interstate commerce 'extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster
and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it." ' "57
Justice Thomas issued a strong dissent.'58
Though it is impossible to be certain, Raich probably does not
substantially alter the above calculations about how Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy would vote in a matter challenging the constitutionality of FACE.
In Thomas's case, it adds further weight to the claim that he would vote to
invalidate the Act. As for Scalia, his concurrence in Raich seems
sufficiently qualified or, in the Justice's own words, "nuanced," to make an
observer think there has been no fundamental change in his support of a
narrowed Commerce Clause.'59  Indeed, Scalia's support for the
constitutionality of the CSA in Raich seems to be based upon Lopez's
allowance that "Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if
that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce."' 6 ° Taking this as settled law, Scalia believed the main question
to be answered in Raich was whether the means chosen by Congress were
"reasonably adapted" to the fulfillment of a valid goal under the Commerce
Clause. 161
Should Kennedy throw his support behind others to uphold FACE, such
a vote would run afoul of the great majority of his prior actions on the
bench. 62 Moreover, the majority opinion in Raich that he joined made it
clear that, "[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities
regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic .... Because the CSA
is a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our
opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality.' ' 63  Since the
Commerce Clause argument for the unconstitutionality of the Act hinges
upon the fact that a rescue is non-economic activity, Kennedy's analysis in
a FACE case would presumably not be affected by his vote in Raich.
While Justice Stevens dissented in Frisby"6 and Justice Breyer wrote
155. Id. at4.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
158. See id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. See, e.g., Leslie Wepner, Comment, The Machine Gun Statute: Its Controversial Past
and Possible Future, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2299 (2007) ("Justice Anthony Kennedy joined
the majority in both Lopez and Raich, but similar to Justice Scalia, has often voted for state power
over congressional power.").
163. 545 U.S. at 25-26.
164. 487 U.S. at 475.
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the majority opinion in Scheidler VII,' 65 there is, on the whole, little
evidence supporting the idea that they or Justices Ginsburg or Souter would
find the Act unconstitutional. Therefore, whether the Roberts Court will
invalidate FACE depends on the views of the new Chief Justice and Justice
Alito.
Before their confirmations, a fair amount of attention was paid to both
Roberts's and Alito's outlooks on the Commerce Clause.'66 In the 2003
case Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, then-Judge Roberts dissented in a
decision by the D.C. Circuit denying a rehearing en banc in a case
involving the Commerce Clause and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 16 7
Roberts criticized the majority as follows:
[S]uch a facial [Commerce Clause] challenge can succeed only if
there are no circumstances in which the Act at issue can be applied
without violating the Commerce Clause. Under the panel's
approach in this case, however, if the defendant in Lopez possessed
the firearm because he was part of an interstate ring and had
brought it to the school to sell it, or the defendant in Morrison
assaulted his victims to promote interstate extortion, then clearly
the challenged regulations in those cases would have substantially
affected interstate commerce, and the facial Commerce Clause
challenges would have failed .... The panel's approach in this case
leads to the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad that,
for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes
regulating "Commerce ... among the several States. "168
Roberts favored en banc review because, after the Rancho Viejo case, a
split existed between the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit on the matter at
issue in Roberts's dissent.'69 He added that "[s]uch review would also
afford the opportunity to consider alternative grounds for sustaining
application of the Act that may be more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent."' 7° Apart from his dissent in Rancho Viejo, Roberts's short time
on the D.C. Circuit does not seem to have substantially illuminated his
views on the Commerce Clause.
During his confirmation hearings, Roberts answered a number of
questions about the Commerce Clause. 171  Most importantly, while
165. 547 U.S. at 12.
166. See, e.g., "Battle under way over Bush pick for top court; Roberts campaigns to nail
support; Specter foresees no filibuster," MSNBC (May 20, 2005),
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8644618/ (last visited June 14, 2008); Stuart Taylor Jr. and Evan
Thomas, Keeping It Real; The left fears him. The right loves him. Why both sides don't quite get
Samuel Alito, NEWSWEEK, November 14, 2005, at 22.
167. 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also Simon Lazarus, Federalism RIP.?:
Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 9 (2006).
168. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
169. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
171. See Lazarus, supra note 167, at 9-18; Paul Alexander Fortenberry & Daniel Canton Beck,
Chief Justice Roberts-Constitutional Interpretations of Article III and the Commerce Clause:
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discussing Raich, he made the following statement:
[Lopez and Morrison were merely] two decisions in the more than
200-year sweep of decisions in which the Supreme Court has...
recognized extremely broad authority on Congress's part, going all
the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John Marshall,
when those Commerce Clause decisions were important in binding
the Nation together as a single commercial unit.1
72
During the same hearings, Roberts opined that "Raich meant that Lopez
and Morrison did not 'junk all the cases that came before." 1 73 He indicated
that the sole constitutional problem with the statute at issue in Lopez was its
"lack of 'a requirement that the firearm be transported in interstate
commerce."" 7 4 According to Roberts, such a flaw could be easily remedied
in the substantial majority of firearm cases. 75 However, in response to one
question, he did reiterate the fact that Lopez and Morrison required, for a
federal statute regulating strictly intrastate conduct to be valid under the
Commerce Clause, "the effects of such activities can be 'aggregate[d]' only
if they are 'commercial in nature.""
'1
76
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito spent significant time on the
federal bench before being nominated to the Supreme Court. 177 In 1996, he
issued a dissent in U.S. v. Rybar, a Third Circuit case involving a
contention that federal regulations governing machine guns violated the
Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment.' 78 Alito began his dissent
by asking rhetorically "Was United States v. Lopez . . . a constitutional
freak? Or did it signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some
meaningful limits on congressional power?"'79  Opposing the majority,
Alito urged that the statute be struck down:
In sum, we are left with no congressional findings and no
appreciable empirical support for the proposition that the purely
intrastate possession of machine guns, by facilitating the
commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, and without such support I do not see how the statutory
provision at issue here can be sustained-unless, contrary to the
lesson that I take from Lopez, the "substantial effects" test is to be
drained of all practical significance. As Lopez reminded us, the
"constitutionally mandated division of authority [between the
federal government and the states] 'was adopted by the Framers to
ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."' . . . And even
Will the "Hapless Toad" and "John Q. Public" Have Any Protection in the Roberts Court?, 13 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 55, 93 (2005).
172. Lazarus, supra note 167, at 15.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Elisabeth Bumiller and Carl Hulse, Bush Picks U.S. Appeals Judge to Take
O'Connor's Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, November 1, 2005, at Al.
178. 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996).
179. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 286 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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today, the normative case for federalism remains strong .... Out of
respect for this vital element, we should require at least some
empirical support before we sustain a novel law that effects "a
significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction. '
Alito's dissent therefore indicates that he sees Lopez as anything but a
"constitutional freak."
Similar to Chief Justice Roberts, Alito faced questions regarding his
views on the Commerce Clause during his confirmation hearings. 8'
Specifically, he stood by his dissent in Rybar.'82 In responding to another
question, he stated:
Well, Lopez is a precedent of the court [sic] and it's been followed
in Morrison and then it has to be considered in connection with the
Supreme Court's decision in Raich. And I think that all three of
those have to be taken into account together. I don't think there's
any question at this point in our history that Congress' power under
the commerce clause is quite broad, and I think that reflects a
number of things, including the way in which our economy and our
society has developed and all of the foreign and interstate activity
that takes place. We do still have a federal system of government,
and I think most people believe that is the system set up by our
Constitution. '83
Since Roberts and Alito took their places on the Court, a number of
federalism cases have been heard with mixed results.'84 However, none of
the cases involved an outright challenge to the constitutionality of a federal
statute on Commerce Clause grounds. Thus far, the Roberts Court has not
decided a Lopez/Morrison/Raich-type case. The only abortion protest
decision issued by the new Court was Scheidler VII, where Roberts joined
the majority and Alito did not take part.'85 Furthermore, neither Roberts nor
Alito decided any cases concerning abortion protest while they were federal
judges. During the lead up to their confirmations, significant inquiries into
both men's views on abortion and the Court's abortion jurisprudence
occurred. However, very little information regarding their opinions on
abortion protest was revealed. While the facts uncovered were, on the
whole, positive from the pro-life perspective, it would nevertheless seem
unwise to assume either Justice's abortion-protesting stance is synonymous
with that of Scalia or Thomas. Roberts was involved in the drafting of a
brief for the federal government in Bray, urging that the Court rule for the
180. Id. at 294 (Alito, J., dissenting).
181. Lazarus, supra note 167, at 28-29.
182. Maxwell L. Steams, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical
Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1, 8 (2007).
183. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the
Supreme Court, The Washington Post (Jan. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01 /10/AR2006011001087.html (last
visited June 14, 2008).
184. See Lazarus, supra note 167, at 4-7; Somin, supra note 153, at 122-33.
185. See 547 U.S. at 12.
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pro-life, direct action participants.'86 However, opinions vary as to whether
a person's role in preparing an appellate brief has any predictive value
regarding how that person might rule on a similar issue as a Justice on the
Supreme Court.
18 7
Scholars are divided as to the significance of this Roberts-Alito
evidence. Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and
Political Science at Duke University, writes confidently that "[o]ver the
past decade, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of Congress's powers
and has greatly expanded the protection of state sovereign immunity ....
with two Bush picks for the high Court, these doctrines almost certainly
will remain and expand in the years to come."'88 Conversely, Ernest A.
Young, Judge Benjamin Harrison Powell Professor of Law at the
University of Texas at Austin, opines:
Many observers have predicted that appointments by President
George W. Bush are likely to accelerate the Court's efforts to limit
national authority. My own view is that this is highly unlikely; if
anything, the losses of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor will yield a more nationalist court on federalism issues.
Despite her moderate instincts and reputation as a swing Justice on
many issues, Justice O'Connor was perhaps the Court's most
committed Justice on questions of state autonomy. And the Chief
Justice, while perhaps more accepting of national power in some
circumstances, deserves to be described as the programmatic
architect of the Federalist Revival. From the states' perspective,
these Justices are virtually irreplaceable. Nor are there strong
grounds to believe that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
share their predecessors' commitment to limiting national power,
even if these jurists turn out to be as "conservative" as many of
their supporters no doubt hope.'89
A review of the salient data suggests Roberts and Alito would vote
against the constitutionality of the Act, if such a matter were before the
Court. Thus, based on the evidence presented in this article, there appears
to be five anti-FACE Justices currently sitting on the Court: Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito. However, the question whether the
Roberts Court will invalidate the Act is a different matter.
Despite the fact that FACE has been on the books for over ten years
and its constitutionality challenged many times, the Court has yet to agree
to hear a case concerning the validity of the Act. Indeed, the Court has
denied certiorari to every post-Morrison FACE case. 9 ° In part, this may
186. See Robin Toner, Cold Paper Trail Leads Some to Scrutinize Nominee's Past Words on
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A22; Abortion rights group pulls anti-Roberts ad,
MSNBC (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8917728/ (last visited June 14, 2008).
187. See, e.g., Toner, supra note 186, at A22.
188. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 647, 657
(2006).
189. Young, supra note 153, at 43.
190. See, e.g., Gregg v. U.S., 532 U.S. 971 (2001); Norton v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003);
Bird v. U.S., 546 U.S. 864 (2005).
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stem from the fact that no federal appellate court has held FACE
unconstitutional; the Court is more likely to grant a petition for certiorari
when there is a dispute among the circuits.' 9' Another factor may be "the
Supreme Court's cert pool, the system of randomly assigning petitions for
review to a single clerk for a recommendation regarding acceptance or
denial of a case."' 92 However, there is disagreement as to the precise effect
of the "cert pool" on the Court.'93 While the Court is asked to review over
7,000 cases per year, it usually grants certiorari to approximately 150.'9'
Therefore, statistically speaking, a case appealed to the Supreme Court has
a miniscule chance of being heard. According to the "Rule of Four," four
or more justices must express an interest in looking at the matter for
certiorari to be granted.' 95
It would appear then that the direct action segment of the pro-life
movement is in an ironic position. The evidence suggests a sufficient
number of anti-FACE Justices currently sit on the Supreme Court to find
the Act violates the Commerce Clause. At the same time, however, pro-life
advocates and others seem incapable of getting the Court to agree to hear a
case challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Not only has the Court
denied every petition for certiorari filed in cases concerning the validity of
FACE, including one in 2007 with both Roberts and Alito on the bench,' 96
but it seems that no dissents have been filed to these denials of certiorari.
This would seem to indicate that the Justices labeled here as "anti-FACE,"
may not be particularly concerned about overturning the Act, even though
they would likely be inclined to find that it violates the Constitution if the
matter was before the Court.
While the appointment of Roberts and Alito to the Court may well
mean the end of FACE, whether or not the act will be overturned remains
uncertain. In order to take advantage of this development, pro-life activists
must work diligently to convince the Court to hear a FACE case. To
accomplish this necessary intermediate step, advocates for the unborn
should create new cases involving the Act in the lower courts. The vast
majority of FACE cases were decided before Morrison. If federal courts
are called upon to decide a substantial number of post-Morrison FACE
191. See, e.g., Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 255 ("We granted certiorari.. to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals on the putative economic motive requirement of 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(c) and (d)." (citations omitted)).
192. Barbara Palmer, The "Bermuda Triangle? ": The Cert Pool and its Influence Over the
Supreme Court's Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105 (2001).
193. See id at 107 ("At best, evidence for the influence of the cert pool over the Court's
agenda is quite limited."); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 950 (2007) (book review) ("Based on this
evidence, I conclude that earlier studies too quickly dismissed the potential impact of law clerks
and the cert pool on the size of the Court's plenary docket.").
194. See The Online News Hour: Supreme Court Watch; Court History; Choosing & Hearing
Cases, PBS (2003),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth-coverage/aw/supreme-court/history-cases.htm (last
visited June 15, 2008).
195. See id.
196. See Bird v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 1501 (2007).
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cases, it may be possible to produce a Circuit split and thereby greatly
increase the chance the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Moreover, in
addition to facial challenges, pro-lifers should choose cases with
sympathetic factual records, similar to a case involving an all-woman direct
action rescue that occurred in Philadelphia in February 1990.197 If such
actions are pursued vigorously, the winds of change may blow in the
direction of the unborn and their defenders in an important area of the
abortion struggle.
197. See Martha Woodall, Women Picket Clinic, PHILA. INQUIRER, February 4, 1990, at B01.
